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The patent law of the United States is based on the policy
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing
for limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their
respective . . . discoveries."' The patent statute executes this
policy by securing to the patentee a limited monopoly.2 On the
other hand, it is the aim of federal anti-trust legislation, in
particular of the Sherman Act of 189o and the Clayton Act of
i914, to maintain competitive conditions in business and in-
dustry by restraining monopolistic combinations and practices.
No wonder, then, that the dash of antagonistic, though perhaps
not inconsistent, policies should have led to much litigation in
the courts and prolific discussion of underlying legal and eco-
nomic theory, particularly in view of the early discovery by
ingenious business men and their lawyers that patent control
offered welcome opportunities of dominating the market
generally.
The problems presented by attempts at market control
through various uses of the patent device may be conveniently
grouped under three main headings: the patent pool, the tying
clause as used in connection with patented articles, and resale
price maintenance on patented articles. Some or all of these
practices are frequently used in combination, so that it may be
difficult at times to determine the judicial attitude toward each
of them in isolation; e.g., a judicial pronouncement against the
tying clause may easily have been influenced by the existence in
the particular case of a pooling arrangement. But so it may
t Member of the Massachusetts bar.
I U. S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. VIII, clause 8.
2 Rev. Stat. sec. 4884 (1875), 35 U.S.C. sec. 40, provides that "every
patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the
term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the
invention or discovery. .... "
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have been influenced by factors of dose consolidation or general
predatory practices, and it seems both logically permissible and
practicable to consider the tying clause separately, giving due
credit to the existence of other elements which may complicate
the picture.
The term "tying clause," as ordinarily understood in the
legal world, means a consensual arrangement, usually in the
form of a condition or covenant in sales contracts or leases of
patented articles or in patent license agreements, by which the
patent owner attempts to strengthen or acquire monopolistic
control over other patented articles or over unpatented mate-
rials or supplies, in the distribution of which he is interested.
In other words, the term includes what Vaughan3 describes as
"dictation of supplementary supplies" and "control of comple-
mentary goods." The collection of representative cases con-
tained in the first section of this article will serve to illustrate
this abstract definition.
A brief consideration of sociological matter entering into
tying clause decisions will form the subject of Section II, which
will be followed by an analysis of the legal argumentation em-
ployed in justifying or condemning tying clauses.
REPRESENTATIVE CASES INVOLVING TYING CLAUSES IN
CONNECTION WITH PATENTED ARTICLES
Up to 1912, when the Supreme Court first "settled" the
question of tying clauses, the leading case on the subject had
been the so-called Button-Fastener case.4 The complainant,
Button Fastener Co., was, by assignment, the owner of several
patents relating to the art of fastening buttons to shoes with
metallic fasteners. It sold its patented machines, through job-
bers, upon condition that they be used only with fasteners made
by it, and each machine bore a metal plate to that effect. When
" Vaughan, The Relation of Patents to Industrial Monopolies (930) 147
ANNALS 40, 47.
' Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed.
z88 (C.C.A. 6th, 1896).
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the Eureka Co. began to make and sell wire staples adapted to
use with the patented machine, this suit was brought to enjoin
contributory infringement. The lower court sustained a de-
murrer to the bill, on the ground that the restriction in question
operated to create a monopoly in an unpatented article, namely
the fasteners, and was therefore void as contrary to public
policy. In the Circuit Court of Appeals, this holding was re-
versed. Circuit Judge Lurton, who wrote the opinion, expressly
recognized that there might be limitations upon a patentee's
power to contract with reference to the use of his invention by
others. The property right of a patentee was admitted to be
"subject, as is all property right, to the general law of the land
* . ." and it was conceded that contracts respecting the use of
inventions and discoveries were "like all other contracts, sub-
ject to the limitations imposed by definite principles of public
policy .... , " But in respect of restraints upon the liberty of con-
tracting imposed by principles of public policy, it should be
borne in mind that "very high considerations of public policy are
involved in the recognition of a wide liberty in the making of
contracts . . ." especially with regard to limitations which a
patentee might put upon the use of his invention.' The monop-
oly in the unpatented staple was thought to depend "upon the
merits of the invention to which it is a mere incident.. 2" and
therefore was held to be "neither obnoxious to public policy,
nor an illegal restrain of trade.... .
In 1912, the Supreme Court decided the first tying clause
case reaching it from the lower courts.8 The Dick Co. owned
patents covering a stencil-duplicating machine known as the
5 77 Fed. 288, z93.
6 77 Fed. 288, 294.
7 77 Fed. z88, 296.
1 Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 2z4 U.S. I (i9 1z). This case was argued
after the death of Mr. Justice Harlan and during the absence of Mr. Justice
Day. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Lurton, who,
as Circuit Judge, had decided the Button Fastener case; with him concurred
Justices McKenna, Holmes and Van Devanter. A dissenting opinion was
delivered by Chief Justice White, with whom Justices Hughes and Lamar
concurred.
C'TYING CLAUSES") AND PATENT MONOPOLY 213
"Rotary Mimeograph." Such machines were sold by the Dick
Co. with the "license restriction" that they should be used only
with the stencil paper, ink and other supplies made by that
company. This suit for contributory infringement was brought
against one who had sold ink to a purchaser of the Dick machine.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified
the question whether the defendant's acts constituted contribu-
tory infringement of the patents. The Supreme Court first
referred to the abundance of cases upholding the right of a
patentee to restrict his licensee in respect of time, place, manner
or purpose of use, considering this right "so elementary we shall
not stop to cite cases." ' The Court then recognizes its problem
as one of drawing the line "between a lawful and an unlawful
qualification upon the use," and calls it "a question of statutory
construction.""0 But the Court proposes to approach that ques-
tion, not with "the narrow scrutiny proper when a statutory
right is asserted to uphold a claim which is lacking in those
moral elements which appeal to the normal man," but with the
liberal interpretation due "a monopoly granted to subserve a
broad public policy, by which large ends are to be attained.""
As in the Button Fastener case, we find the argument that the
market for the sale of supplies to the users of the machine was
a market which the patent owner alone had created by making
and selling a new invention;' 2 and that, if the terms imposed
be too onerous, the patented article would not find a market, the
public being always free to refuse to accept it." And then,
pointing to the undoubted right of a patentee to let his inven-
tion go entirely unused, this significant passage: "This larger
right embraces the lesser of permitting others to use upon such
terms as the patentee chooses to prescribe."' 4 The Court sees
224 U. S. I, iS.
2 24 U. S. I, 26.
"224 U. S. I, 27.
2 24 U. S. I, 32.
224 U. S. i, 34.
12 z24 U. S. I, 35. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U. S. 405 (19o8), a patentee had been allowed to restrain one who
was infringing his patent, although he had, during a long term of years,
neither used the invention himself, nor allowed others to use it.
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no limitations on patentees' rights in the Sherman Act, and
considers arguments based upon suggestions of public policy
"not recognized in the patent laws" as not relevant, belonging
to the legislative rather than the judicial field; it reminds one of
the long line of lower court decisions, overruling which would
inflict "disastrous results upon individuals who have made large
investments in reliance upon them"; and reaches the conclusion
that there is no difference, in principle, between the restrictions
in question and restrictions as to the time, place or purpose of
use.
1 5
The dissenting opinion sees a fallacy in the assumption that
the right of the patentee himself to employ any desired mate-
rials in using the patented machine is a right derived from or
protected by the patent law, it being in reality a right arising
from the ownership of property (i.e., the machine) ; therefore,
it could not be said that the restriction in question was a restric-
tion upon the use of the machine protected by the patent law. 6
The Dick case was overruled, and the Button Fastener case
thereby discredited, by the Motion Picture Patents case of
1917." Reduced to their simplest terms, the facts were that
the Patents Co. held patents for improvements in motion picture
exhibiting machines; it had licensed Precision Machine Co. to
manufacture and sell machines embodying the patented inven-
tiQns; and the licensee had covenanted to sell such machines
only upon the condition, shown by a plate attached to each
machine, that they should be used solely with moving pictures
leased by a licensee of Motion Picture Patents Co. The de-
fendant Film Manufacturing Co. had supplied a theatre with
:"5 2 4 U. S. 1, 35.
16 224 U. S. I, 52. In deference to the majority, but hardly making
matters any better, the Chief Justice hastens to add that when he said "it
cannot be said" he meant that it could not be so done "in reason."
17 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(917). The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Clarke, with
whom Chief Justice White and Justices Brandeis, Day and Pitney concurred,
with Mr. Justice McReynolds concurring in the result. A dissenting opinion
was delivered by Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom Justices McKenna and Van
Devanter concurred.
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some of its own films, for use with a machine purchased from
the plaintiff's licensee and bearing the required notice. The
plaintiff's films, while originally protected by a patent, were
unpatented at the time of the alleged infringement. The lower
courts held the tying restriction invalid as against the purchaser
of the machine, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court,
professing not to be concerned with any contractual questions,"9
based its decision squarely on the limited scope of the patent
grant. The restriction was upon the use of supplies only and
could not be termed a restriction upon the use of the machine
itself; the patent did not include the right to use the patented
machine exclusively with prescribed materials; therefore, con-
trol over materials was not protected by the patent law.19 The
argument deducing the right to impose tying restrictions from
the right to withhold the patent altogether from public use,
which had been sanctioned in the Button Fastener and Dick
cases, is now rejected for its "failure to distinguish between the
rights which are given to the inventor by the patent law and
which he may assert against all the world through an infringe-
ment proceeding and rights which he may create for himself
by private contract which, however, are subject to the rules of
general as distinguished from those of the patent law." °0 To
enforce the restriction would be to create a monopoly in moving
picture films, wholly outside of the patent covering the
machine.'
Mr. Justice Holmes rested his dissent upon the patentee's
right to keep his device wholly out of use. He saw no pre-
dominant public interest contravened by the tying clause, and,
like the majority had done in the Dick case, pointed to the many
IS 243 U. S. 502, 509.
' 243 U. S. 502, 512, 513.
o 243 U. S. 502, 514.
1 243 U. S. 502, 518. Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act, enacted before the bill
in this case was filed, had been applied to the case by the Circuit Court of
Appeals; but the Supreme Court found it unnecessary so to do, being content
to accept the statute as "a most persuasive expression of the public policy of
our country" (id. at 517, 518).
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and important transactions which might have taken place on
the faith of earlier decisions. 2
In 1918, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
the first United Shoe Machinery case. 3 This was a suit by the
Government under the Sherman Act to dissolve the United
Shoe Machinery combine and to have its leases containing tying
clauses declared illegal. While the combination problem in the
case is not of immediate interest in our connection, its dose
relationship to the tying clause problem should be noted. It
seems that the Government initially sought condemnation of
the tying clauses as a means of completing and assuring the
monopoly acquired by combination, but that it finally put its
main reliance upon the leases as an independent ground for
relief.2" The Company, controlling many important patents
and dominating the manufacture of and trade in shoe machin-
ery, leased its patented machines to shoe manufacturers for
terms of 17 years. The leases contained various conditions
which are enumerated and explained in the opinions.2 The
most important of them were the "exclusive use" clause, requir-
ing the lessee of lasting and tacking machinery to use it, to the
exclusion of other makes, and the "prohibitive" clause, for-
bidding the use of the leased machinery in the manufacture of
shoes upon which certain.prior operations had been performed
with machines not leased from the Company. There was also a
clause requiring the lessee to obtain all fastening material
needed in the operation of the leased machines exclusively from
the lessor. Violation of any term of the lease gave the lessor
the right to terminate, not only the particular lease, but all
other leases which the lessee might have from the United
Company. The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice McKenna,
22 243 U. S. 502, 519, 520.
23 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of N. J., 247 U. S. 32
(1918).
24 See, for instance, the opinions of Dodge, Circuit Judge, and Brown,
District Judge, in the same case, zz Fed. 349 (U.S.D.C. Mass., 1915), at
385 and 415 respectively.
25 247 U. S. 32, 61-63, 68-69.
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affirmed the decree of the District Court in the defendant's
favor."3 The leases were considered a lawful exercise of the
patent monopoly, and the terms imposed by them were said to
lie "within the field covered by the patent law" and therefore
not to violate the Anti-Trust Act." Pointing to the economic
advantages of the leasing system to the shoe manufacturer and
to the necessity of proper coordination of successive machinery,
the Court found that "the installation could have had no other
incentive than the excellence of the machines and the advantage
of their use, the conditions imposed having adequate compensa-
tion and not being offensive to the letter or the policy of the
law.)2 8
Mr. Justice Day, dissenting, saw in the tying system an un-
warranted extension of the patent monopoly, both in scope and
in time, and believed the restrictive and prohibitive clauses to
be within the Sherman Act.2" "Whenever a new machine is
acquired by the lessee for the period of seventeen years... the
chain is forged anew which binds him to the use of the lessor's
machines, to the practical exclusion of all others."3
The second United Shoe Machinery case involved a Gov-
ernment suit under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, brought to
restrain the use of tying clauses in the United Company's
leases." The lower court enjoined the use of seven specific
provisions, among them the "exclusive use" and the "prohibi-
tive" clauses, and limited the Company's right to cancel leases
for a violation of terms to the particular lease whose terms had
been broken.2 This decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
0 The decision was 4:3, Justices McReynolds and Brandeis taking no part
in it. Mr. Justice Day wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Pitney
and Clarke concurred, and Mr. Justice Clarke wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Day and Pitney concurred.
" 247 U. S. 32, 57-
247 U. S. 32, 63-64, 66.
247 U. S. 32, 73-75.
247 U. S. 32, 70, 71.
Z1 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. U. S., 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
3'-'U. S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 264 Fed. 138 (U.S.D.C., Mo.,
i92o). For prior stages of the same case, see 227 Fed. 507 (915) (prelim-
inary injunction) and 234 Fed. 127 (1916) (motion to dismiss).
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Mr. Justice Day, writing the opinion of the court, characterized
the tying restrictions as a system which, in view of the United
Company's dominating position in supplying machinery of
certain classes, " practically compelled the use of the machinery
of the lessor "except upon risks which manufacturers will not
willingly incur."3 The Court overruled the Company's con-
tention that the decree in its favor, rendered in the former suit
under the Sherman Act, constituted rem judicatem in the
present case, holding that the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act
provided different "tests of liability" and that the Clayton Act
was intended to supplement the Sherman Act, emphasizing the
words "whether patented or unpatented" used in Section 3 of
the Clayton Act.3 5 It further held that the Act, as applied, did
not deprive the patentee of his property without due process of
law, since the patent grant did not limit the power of Congress
to prohibit in the public interest the making of agreements which
might lessen competition and build up monopoly." There was
a dissent, without opinion, by Mr. Justice McKenna.
At this point, two decisions by a federal district court may
well serve as an illustrative interlude. One of them" was
decided before the Supreme Court had spoken in the second
Shoe Machinery case. It involved an injunction proceeding by
the Westinghouse Company against interference by the Fibre
Company with contracts by which the plaintiff had licensed
othes to manufacture and sell gears covered by certain patents,
in consideration of, inter alia, the licensees' covenants to pur-
chase all materials employed in such manufacture from the
licensor or other designated manufacturers. The defendant
contended that the tying clauses in the license agreements were
invalid under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The court, appar-
33 The Company controlled over 95 per cent of such business in the U. S.
z64 Fed. 138, 163.
34 258 U.S. 451, 458.
35 258 U. S. 451, 459, 460.
36 258 U. S. 451, 462-464.
17 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., z68 Fed.
121 (U.S.D.C. Del., 1920).
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ently finding no oppressive monopolistic conditions to exist in
the field, held the right to control the unpatented materials to
be "an inevitable adjunct of the patent and a part of the patent
monopoly," and granted a preliminary injunction; but it was at
pains to point out that the question decided in the Motion Pic-
ture Patents case was "radically different" from the question
before it, and furthermore, that the first Shoe Machinery case
might have modified that decision."s
Eight years later, the same court had to deal with a phase
of the radio litigation. " Radio Corporation controlled certain
patents covering radio receiving sets; it licensed manufacturers
of such sets to employ those patents and to sell the sets for
certain described uses." The license agreements contained a
clause whereby the licensee agreed to purchase from Radio Cor-
poration all vacuum tubes required to make the apparatus initi-
ally operative. The tubes were not themselves under patent
protection. This suit was brought by manufacturers of other
tubes to enjoin the enforcement by Radio Corporation of the
tying clause which was alleged to be in violation of the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act. The court granted a preliminary
injunction.' It conceded the defendant's argument that license
agreements were not within Section 3 of the Clayton Act and
should not be written into it by judicial legislation, but got
around the difficulty by considering the tying clause itself as a
contract for the sale of goods within the terms of the Act. "
The court's finding that the clause in question substantially les-
N 268 Fed. 121, iz6.
" Lord v. Radio Corp. of America, 24 Fed. (2d) 565 (U.S.D.C. Del.,
z928). Affirmed, 28 Fed. (2d) 257 (C.C.A. 3rd, I928). Cert. denied,
278 U.S. 648. (1928).
"The attempted limitation of uses to which such sets might be put was
not in issue in this case; but cf. the General Talking Pictures case, infra p. 223
et seg.
"I Later, a final injunction issued in the cause. 35 F. (2d) 962 (U.S.
D.C., Del., i929). Affirmed, sub nom. Radio Corp. of America v. DeForest
Radio Co., in 47 F. (2d) 6o6 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1931). Cert. denied, 283 U.S.
847 (93I).
42 24 F. (2d) 565, 566.
220 LAW JOURNAL- MARCH, 194-1
sened competition and tended to create a monopoly in radio
tubes was based upon the dominating position of the defendant
and its licensees in the business done in receiving sets,43 the
natural inclination of licensees to equip all their sets, whether
believed to be within the licensor's patents or not, with the
licensor's tubes in order to avoid litigation, and the practical
tendency of initial equipment to determine replacements." The
Westinghouse case of i92O was distinguished on the ground that
a finding of substantial lessening of competition and of tendency
toward monopoly was lacking there; furthermore, doubt was
cast upon the status of that case in the light of the second Shoe
Machinery decision.4"
A case in which no patents were involved was decided by the
Supreme Court in 1923." The Sinclair Co., a manufacturer
of gasoline, leased underground tanks with pumps to retail
dealers, at nominal rentals and upon condition that the equip-
ment should be used only with gasoline supplied by the lessor.
After finding that such restrictions were a general practice in
the field and that keen competition was in fact existing, the
Court concluded that the tying clauses did not violate the
Clayton Act or otherwise constitute an unfair method of
competition.
The Carbice case of 1931 shows a further development of
the tendency first apparent in the Motion Picture Patents case
and confirmed by the Radio case." This was a suit to enjoin
contributory infringement brought by the Patents Development
Corporation and Dry Ice Corporation as its exclusive licensee
43 The plaintiffs put the figure at 95 per cent; the defendant conceded a
maximum of 70 per cent. 24. F. (zd) 565, 566.
41 F. (ad) 565, 568.
45 24. F. (2d) 565, 568, 569. At the final hearing it was shown that
the defendant's control in the tube field actually decreased during the period
in which the tying clause was in force; but the court attributed this phenomen-
on to other factors. 35 F. (?d) 962, 963.
4" Fed. Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
47 261 U. S. 463, 4-73 et seq.
48 Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283
U. S. 27 (93).
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against the Carbice Corporation. The Patents Development
Corporation owned a patent for the invention of a package
employing solid carbon dioxide as a refrigerant for ice cream or
other freezable products and so insulating the dioxide that it
was less accessible for exterior heat than the freezable products.
The solid carbon dioxide itself was unpatented. Dry Ice Cor-
poration, as the exclusive licensee of the patent, did not manu-
facture the packages and did not formally license others so to
do; but it manufactured and sold solid carbon dioxide, making
it a condition of each such sale that the goods should not be used
except in containers or apparatus provided or approved by the
vendor, and that containers or apparatus provided or approved
by the vendor should be used only with the vendor's "dry ice"
(solid carbon dioxide). The defendant, another manufacturer
of solid carbon dioxide, had sold its product to customers of the
Dry Ice Corporation for use in packages like those described in
the patent. The Court, assuming the validity of the patent,
denied relief on the ground that the attempted limitation of
customers to the use of "dry ice" was invalid.4" The Dry Ice
Corporation was deemed to have extended to each of its cus-
tomers an implied license to use the invention, upon a condition
limiting the licensee to the use of unpatented materials pur-
chased from the licensor. But a patent owner "may not exact
as the condition of a license that unpatented materials used in
connection with the invention shall be purchased only from the
licensor."'" The case was thus squarely brought within the
broad general principle of the Motion Picture Patents case,
without any reliance by the Court upon Section 3 of the Clayton
Act such as had been placed upon that statute by the lower
courts in the Radio case.
The International Business Machines case"' presented a suit
by the Government under the Clayton Act to enjoin the Inter-
', Later, after reargument, the patent was declared invalid for want of
novelty and invention. 283 U. S. 420 (1931).
1. 283 U.S. 27, 31.
s' International Business Machines Corp. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 131 (1936).
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national and three other corporations from leasing their tabulat-
ing and other machines upon the condition that the lessee should
use with such machines only tabulating cards manufactured by
the lessor. It appeared that the International Corporation and
Remington Rand completely controlled the field, and that they
had an agreement to respect each other's lease contracts in the
sale of cards. There were patents covering the machines and the
cards when perforated, but apparently not cards in the un-
punched state. However, the Court was willing to assume in
the International's52 favor that the cards were protected by
patents even in the unpunched state. On that assumption, it
affirmed the action of the lower court in granting an injunction.
While one purpose of Section 3 df the Clayton Act undoubtedly
was to prevent the "tying" of unpatented supplies, 3 the practice
of tying several patented articles together, revealed in the first
Sloe Machinery litigation, was as much within the purview of
the statute.5" The plainly expressed purpose of the statute was
to make the lawfulness of the tying clause a matter to be deter-
mined "by applying to it the standards prescribed by Section 3
as though the leased article and its parts were unpatented."
The International's contention that without the tying clause an
adequate supply of cards would not be forthcoming from com-
petitors was dismissed as not supported by the evidence; and it
was said that even if there were any exceptions to the unambigu-
ous command of the Clayton Act, protection of "good will" for
the machines could not justify a tying clause designed to elim-
inate competition.5
Two recent cases, decided within a few months of each other,
may further serve to illustrate the tying clause problem as
viewed by the Supreme Court. In the first of them, the parties
were competing manufacturers of bituminous emulsion-an
52 Only the International appealed in the case.
-1 See 51 CONG. RECORD, Part 14, 63rd Cong., 2nd Session, 14.089 ff.
" See CONG. RECORD, Vol. 5I, Part 14, 63rd Cong., 3rd Session, 14.Z75.
55 z98 U. S. 13, 137, 338.
56 z98 U. S. 13, 130, 140.
57 Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458 (1938).
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unpatented article produced in this country by many concerns
and in common use by their customers for various purposes.
The Barber Co. owned a process patent for a method by which
a spray of the emulsion was used to form a film on the surface
of cement concrete roads, in order to retard evaporation during
curing. The Company did not itself engage in road building
or compete with road contractors. It did not grant to road
builders a formal license to use the patented process; but any
road builder could buy emulsion from it for that purpose, so
that such sales implied authority to practice the invention. When
Leitch Co. began to sell its emulsion for such use Barber Co.
sued it as a contributory infringer. The Court considered the
plaintiff's method of doing business as the practical equivalent
of granting written licenses to its customers upon the condition
that the patented method should be practiced only with emulsion
purchased from it. "Thus, the sole purpose to which the patent
is put is thereby to suppress competition in the production and
sale of staple unpatented material for this use in road build-
ing." 5 Again Mr. Justice Brandeis, who had also written the
opinion of the court in the Carbice case, rests his decision on the
broad ground that "the owner of the patent monopoly, ignoring
the limitation inherent in the patent grant, sought by its method
of doing business to extend the monopoly to unpatented material
used in practicing the invention.1"
The other 1938 case,"0 while not directly concerned with the
tying clause problem, throws interesting sidelights on it. The
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. owned patents for in-
ventions in vacuum tube amplifiers which had been used in wire
and radio telephony, talking motion pictures, and other fields.
r3 0z U. S. 458, 461.
GO 30z U. S. 458, 463.
" General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175
(1938). The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Butler. Mr.
Justice Black delivered a dissenting opinion. Justices Roberts, Cardozo and
Reed took no part in the decision. It may be of some interest that this case
was argued on December 13 and 14, 1937, and decided on May z, 1938;
whereas the Leitch case, likewise argued on Dec., 14, 1937, was decided on
Jan. 3, 1938.
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One, known as the "commercial" field, included talking picture
equipment for theatres. Another, called the "private" field,
embraced radio broadcast reception, radio amateur reception,
and radio experimental reception. Western Electric Co. and
others were subsidiaries of the Telephone Co. and were by it
exclusively licensed in the "commercial" field, i.e., in making
and supplying to theatres talking picture equipment including
amplifiers embodying the inventions. In the "private" field,
however, Telephone Co., through Radio Corporation of Amer-
ica, granted non-exclusive licenses to others, including the
American Transformer Co., which licenses were limited to the
manufacture and sale of the amplifiers for private use. Those
licenses also required that the amplifiers should have notices
affixed to them stating that the apparatus was licensed only for
radio amateur, experimental and broadcast reception under the
patents in question. The defendant, General Talking Pictures
Corporation, was also engaged in furnishing talking picture
equipment to theatres. It had purchased amplifiers covered by
the patents in question from the American Transformer Co.
and included them in the equipment furnished by it to theatres.
These suits were brought to enjoin infringement, and the plain-
tiffs prevailed. The Court, emphasizing that the Transformer
Co. was a mere licensee and not a purchaser of apparatus from
the patent owner, saw no attempt in this case on the part of
the patent owner to extend the scope of the monopoly beyond
that contemplated by the patent statute.6'
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, took the position that the
contractual rights of the plaintiffs against the Transformer Co.
as licensee could not help them in this infringement suit against
a third party. The patent statute, on which alone the plaintiffs
could rely, did not empower a patentee to extend his monopoly
into the country's channels of trade after a sale which passed
title.62 The very case before the Court disclosed a "patent pooP'
system of tremendous proportions, indicating "the possible
61 304 U. S. 175
, 
ISI.
62 304 U. S. 175, 184, 185.
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extent of a power to direct and censor the ultimate use of the
multitudinous patented articles with which the nation's daily
life is concerned.
6 3
SOME SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ENTERING INTO TYING
CLAUSE DECISIONS
Obviously, it cannot be attempted here to do justice to all
of the economic and social conditions surrounding the use of
the patent device for the acquisition or reenforcement of monop-
olistic control. This section will have to be limited to a brief
discussion of some of the matters dehors strictly legal theory
which may, at one time or another, have played a part in the
varying fate of the tying clause at the hands of the courts.
One thing is certain: the judges, whether on the majority
or on the dissenting side, have frequently, and by no means
sparingly, engaged in considerations of general policy in con-
nection with tying clauses, although they have on occasion
emphatically disavowed any such intention.64
The normal operation of tying restrictions, whether con-
cerning "supplementary" supplies or "complimentary" goods, is
readily understood. The patent owner, in all cases where the
invention covered by his patent constitutes a great improvement
over competitive (patented or unpatented) machines, products
or processes, is in a superior bargaining position. He utilizes
this advantage, springing from the merits of the particular in-
vention, in order to compel acceptance, not only of the subject
matter of his patent, but also of other goods or supplies, patented
or unpatented, which might not otherwise find so ready a
market. The economic power yielded by a single patent is
multiplied where an individual business unit or group controls
304 U. S. 175, i86, 187.
64The Supreme Court said in the Dick case: "Arguments based upon sug-
gestions of public policy, not recognized in the patent laws, are not relevant.
The field to which we are invited by such arguments is legislative, not judi-
cial." 224 U.S. I, 35. Compare the earlier statement in the same opinion,
characterizing the patent claim as "a monopoly granted to subserve a broad
public policy, by which large ends are to be attained." 224 U.S. 1, 27.
226 LAW JOURNAL - MARCH, 1941
numerous important patents relating to a particular line of
industry; and power may be further increased by patent pooling
and cross-licensing arrangements. Under such conditions, a
system of tying restrictions may be thoroughly effective in
smothering competition and securing monopolistic control.
"The very existence of such restrictions suggests that in its
absence a competing article of equal or better quality would be
offered at the same or at a lower price." 5
This passage from Vaughan was quoted with approval by
Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Carbice case, " and requoted by Mr.
Justice Stone in the Business Machines case." But earlier
judicial pronouncements had looked at the problem from a
different point of view. The majority in the Dick case justified
control of the market in supplementary goods by the patent
owner by pointing out that it "was a market which he alone
created by the making and selling of a new invention," and that,
if the terms imposed be too onerous, the patented article would
not find a market.6" Similarly, Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting
in the Motion Picture Patents case, saw no predominant public
interest involved, because domination of the market in supplies
could be only coextensive with the public desire for the patented
invention.6" On the other hand, the majority in that case, as
Chief Justice White had done as a dissenter in the Dick case,"
professed concern over the increased possibilities of "tying up"
many ordinary necessities of life, resulting from modern corpor-
ate organization,"' and similar considerations motivated Mr.
Justice Black in his dissent in the General Talking Pictures
case.
7 2
The argument, advanced occasionally, that "tying" affords
65 VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM, 125, 17 (925).
66 283 U. S. 27, 32, note 2.
67 298 U. S. 131, 139.
6S 224 U. S. I, 32, 34.
69 243 U. S. 5o2, 520.
7 0 224 U. S. I, 55, 56.
71 243 U. S. 502, 513, 514.
72 304 U. S. 175
,
I86, 187.
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a convenient measure of royalty, because the amount of supplies
or materials needed and consequently the profits derived from
their sale by the patent owner are proportioned to the use made
of the patented machine or process, 3 does not seem to have
made much of an impression on the courts. Obviously, there
are more direct ways in which such proportionment may be
achieved.
Technological arguments have met with varying success in
the courts. The Supreme Court in the first Shoe Machinery
case gave express recognition to the necessity of coordination
of the various machines operating in succession, a factor much
insisted upon by the defendant. 4 On the other hand, the Court
in the Business Machines case pointed out that protection of
good will did not justify tying clauses, since it could be achieved
by requiring the use of (any) material conforming to necessary
specifications."
These are some of the considerations peculiarly applicable
to tying clause problems. The courts, however, rarely deal with
such problems in isolation. And even when they do, their
attitude may vary according to the magnitude of the interests
involved in the particular case and according to the state of
public opinion and of anti-trust feeling and activities in general.
How their attempts to adjust conflicting interests have been
rationalized in terms of legal doctrine, will form the subject
matter of the following section of this article.
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION EMPLOYED IN JUSTIFYING OR
CONDEMNING TYING CLAUSES
The "conflict" between the patent monopoly and anti-
trust legislation has been the subject of much discussion among
legal writers. Some of them recognize the existence of such
" See, for instance, Montague, The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the
Patent Law, 51 (Reprint from YALE L. J., 1912).
74 247 U. S. 3z, 64. Defendant's Brief on Reargument, Z 1-24.
70 298 U.s. 131, 140.
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a conflict. 6 Others deny it." It seems idle to go into meta-
physical speculations on this point. The policies underlying
patent and anti-trust legislation, respectively, may well be
regarded as antagonistic, though not mutually inconsistent. But
whether the two groups of statutes be in "conflict," or "contact,"
or in the relation of general rule and exception, or entirely
heterogeneous, it is a fact that the courts have experienced con-
siderable trouble in defining and delimiting the respective
spheres of operation.
In dealing with the tying clause problem, the Supreme
Court has by no means pursued a consistent course. At first,
in upholding the tying clause in the Dick case, it relied mainly
on the theory that the whole includes all its parts; i.e., the
patentee's right to let his invention go to waste was held, by
argument a fortiori, to embrace the lesser right of permitting
its use upon such terms as he might choose to prescribe." An
English judge has carried this notion to its extreme by saying
that it did not matter how unreasonable or absurd the conditions
were."' Obviously, there must be some limitations to such
anti-social doctrine." The Button Fastener case conceded that
78 See, for instance, Montague, The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the
Patent Law, Reprint from YALE L. J. (191z), 36 f., seeing "flat contradic-
tion" and "mutual inconsistency," and using the very conflict as a basis for
his argument in favor of the tying clause; on the other hand, see Peaslee, The
Effect of the Federal "Anti-Trust Laws" on Commerce in Patented and Copy-
righted Articles (915) 28 HARV. L. REv. 394, seeing "contact, if not
conflict," but arguing that the patent law does not confer the right to make
tying contracts (at 404).
"' See, for instance, Lamb, The Relation of the Patent Law to the Federal
Anti-Trust Laws (1927) 1Z CORN. L. Q. 261, regarding patent rights as a
valid exception to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act (at 766). Feuer, The
Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1I45,
goes furthest in finding a "no-man's land" between patent monopoly and
Clayton Act, properly interpreted (at 1 i65-1168).
78 Supra, note 14.
7o Incandescent Gas Light Co., Ltd., v. Cantello, 12 Pat. Cas. z6z (1895).
5o In England, tying clauses of any kind are now outlawed as being in
restraint of trade and contrary to public policy, and insertion of any such clauses
in sale, lease or license agreements affords a complete defense in infringement
suits. Patents and Designs Acts of 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 29, s. 38, as amended
by Act of 1919, 9 and 1o Geo. V., c. 8o, s. 2o.
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the patentee's rights are subject to "the limitations imposed by
definite principles of public policy."'" It just seems that the
courts in the earlier days, up to the time of the Clayton Act, did
not regard the principles of public policy prevailing at common
law and under the Sherman Act as being sufficiently "definite."
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his dissent in the Motion Picture
Patents case, reasoned that "generally speaking, the measure
of a condition is the consequence of a breach, and if that con-
sequence is one that the owner may impose unconditionally,
he may impose it conditionally upon a certain event."82 Of
course, if the condition is broken, and the patent owner there-
upon withdraws the privilege of use, it is quite true that the
resulting state of things is no different from that brought about
by an initial refusal to grant the privilege. But this overlooks
that a condition may also be measured by the consequence of
its observance5 in fact, the patent owner would ordinarily be
interested in having the condition respected rather than
violated5 and here it is that anti-trust policy comes in.
The majority in the Dick case recognized the problem as
one of drawing the line between a "lawful" and an "unlawful"
qualification upon the use,83 but came to the conclusion that the
tying restriction in question was not different, in principle, from
qualifications in respect of time, place or purpose of use which
had always been recognized by the courts.8" But was there
really no "difference in principle," if those words may be taken
to include marked differences in degree? The patent statute
itself allows a patentee to grant an exclusive right under his
patent "to the whole or any specified part of the United
States."8 " The theory of a "partial" grant may also quite
logically be applied to limitations in time. And even of limita-
tions in respect of purpose of use it may be said that they do
no more than delimit a partial grant, reserving to the patent
81 77 Fed. 788, 293.
243 U. S. 50z, 519.
+ Supra, note io.84 Supra, notes 9 and 15.
REv. STAT. sec. 4898 (875); 35 U.S.C. sec. 47 (I934).
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owner the right to exclude others from all uses not granted.
But there comes a point where the line must be drawn between
a partial grant on the one hand, and a grant with a collateral
restriction on the other. It seems rather strained to regard a
tying clause as a definition of what is granted and what is re-
served by the patent owner, and to say that he merely "splits"
his exclusive right to use in such cases." The Government aimed
at a reductio ad absurdu m of such logic when, in the second Shoe
Machinery suit, it put the imaginary case of an owner of a gun
patent who "could not, by leasing a gun and reserving all use
of the invention except that of killing the maker of a competing
gun, make such a condition legal by giving it the form of a
reservation of the use of a patent."'
The argument a fortiori, based upon the patent owner's
right to keep his device wholly out of use, has a counterpart in
the attempt sometimes made to identify the imposition of a
tying clause with the setting of a price by the patent owner.
Thus, the Dick case implies that the owner may "choose to take
his profit in this way, instead of taking it by a higher price for
the machines.""8 A short answer to this would seem to be that
neither in common understanding nor in law are conditions con-
sidered as the equivalent of price, and while it is the normal
policy of the law not to limit the compensation asked and re-
ceived by the owner of property, it is its policy to maintain
competitive conditions in the market.
The decision in the Motion Picture Patents case, allowing
an alleged infringer to defend on the ground of invalidity of
the tying restriction, reached that result on general grounds, but
regarding the Clayton Act as a persuasive declaration of public
policy. No such favorable recognition was accorded the Act
86 On the question of divisibility of the patent right, see Powell, The
Nature of a Patent Right (1917) 17 CoL. L. REv. 663. Professor Powell
comes to the conclusion that the answer to that problem depends upon the
practical consequences attendant on the division in question (at 683-684).
87 258 U. S. 52; Cases and Points, Brief for the United States, p. 45.
88 224 U. S. I, 50.
89 Supra, note 21.
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in the first Shoe Machinery case, decided the following year,
but it should be pointed out that proceedings in the case had been
commenced before the enactment of the statute. Technically,
that case was distinguished from the Motion Picture Patents
decision on the ground that the United Shoe Machinery Com-
pany leased its machinery, whereas the Patents Company had
sold its machines; and a patent owner "cannot grant the title
and retain the incidents of it." But it does not appear from the
opinion in the Picture Patents case that the Court had relied
very heavily on such reasoning; in fact, the opinion deals almost
exclusively with the scope of the patent monopoly.
It should be said here generally that the distinction between
sale, lease, or license, whatever its significance may be in other
connections, does not seem to be a proper basis for a differentia-
tion in tying clause problems. For one thing, we are concerned
here with statutes aimed at the maintenance of competitive
conditions, not with the common law policy against restraints
on alienation. Moreover, the Court itself does not now regard
such a distinction as controlling. Of course, Section 3 of the
Clayton Act expressly mentions leases, along with sales or
contracts for sale, in its prohibition of tying clauses. But the
Court has gone further and has held that even a licensee cannot
be limited to exclusive use of materials furnished by the
licensor."c On the other hand, it decided the same year that a
patent owner may dictate the purpose to which his device may
be put even by an outright purchaser from his licensee. 9'
When Congress had before it the bill which became Section
3 of the Clayton Act, it could not foresee what the Supreme
Court would pronounce as the law in 19 17 and 1 918 ; but it
was familiar with the decision in the Dick case and with the
contentions of the parties in the first Shoe Machinery case.' -
t,' Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
V1 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175
(1938).
"* International Business Machines Corp. v. U. S., 298 U.S. 131 (1936),
at 137.
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An argument was made, by the corporation bar and in the brief
for the defendants on reargument of the second Shoe Machinery
case, to the effect that the Clayton Act was merely declaratory
and rendered nothing unlawful which had not been unlawful
before; but the second Shoe Machinery case established the
contrary." The reasoning by which the Court arrived at that
result has aptly been described as "resourcefully tugging at its
own boot-straps."9 The tenuous ground on which the Motion
Picture Patents case had been distinguished in the first Shoe
Machinery case has already been noted. But while the result in
the second Shoe Machinery case is easily justifiable on its own
grounds, it took considerable reasoning in a circle to reconcile
that decision with the former opinion in the Sherman Act suit,
even apart from the question of res judicata. The former case
had definitely decided that the lessor of a patented machine had
the right to impose tying restrictions, such right being part
and parcel of the patent monopoly. But now the Court discovers
that "the patent right confers no privilege to make contracts
in themselves illegal, and certainly not to make those directly
violative of valid statutes of the United States."9 Of course,
the very question to be decided was whether Section 3 of the
Clayton Act was a "valid statute of the United States," in view
of the fact that it cut down on rights which the Court in 1918
had held to have been within the patent monopoly. Had the
first Shoe Machinery case been expressly overruled in its con-
struction of the patent grant, no such difficulties would have
" McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (936), zi lowA
L. REv. z74, at 281. Even before the first Shoe Machinery decision, it had
been argued-and very convincingly--that the Sherman Act already had the
effect of prohibiting all contracts in restraint of trade (qualified only by the
"rule of reason"), that the test under Sec. 3 of the Clayton Act did not differ
greatly from that, and that the words "whether patented or unpatented" in
the latter statute were unecessary. Peasles, The Effect of the Federal "Anti-
Trust Laws" on Commerce in Patented and Copyrighted Articles (1915) 28
HARV. L. REv. 394.
" Feuer, The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws (938) 38 COL.
L. REv. 1145, 116o.
95 258 U.S. 451, 463.
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confronted the Court. That the second case in effect overruled
the first by discarding its theory," seems to be a point well taken.
It may be suggested, however, that the Court, had it been
prepared to overrule the earlier decision, might have found it
even harder to dispose of the defense of res judicata.
The decision of the United States District Court for Dela-
ware in the Westinghouse Electric case" hardly merits extended
discussion here, in view of the later decision by the same court
in the Radio case.s The Westinghouse decision was rendered
at a time when the first Shoe Machinery case was the law of the
Supreme Court; but after that Court had decided against the
same defendant in the Clayton Act suit, the District Court for
Delaware found it difficult to reconcile its former decision with
the new law;" its half-hearted attempt, in addition to that,
to distinguish the earlier case on the facts must be regarded as
mere make-weight, in view of the fact that the Westinghouse
opinion had looked upon the right to control unpatented mate-
rials as "an inevitable adjunct of the patent and a part of the
patent monopoly."'
The important point in the Radio decision was its theory
that the tying clause itself could be considered as a contract for
the sale of goods within the meaning of Section 3 of the Clayton
Act." Even though the tying clause in question "tied" the tubes
to the apparatus to be manufactured by a licensee, even though
there was neither sale nor lease of such apparatus but merely a
license to manufacture it under the licensor's patents, the court
found it possible to make Section 3 of the Clayton Act the basis
of its decision.
The Supreme Court has been more cautious in its statutory
construction, but has gone even further by condemning tying
0" McCormack, Restrictive Patent Licenses and Restraint of Trade (193 1)
31 COL. L. REv. 743, 756.
97 Supra, note 37.
' Supra, note 39.
o" Supra, note 45.
* Supra, note 38.
2 Supra, note 42.
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clauses without the aid of the Clayton Act. Both the Carbice
case3 and the Leitch case4 were decided on broad general prin-
ciples. The former, employing the notion of an implied license
to use the patented invention, arising from each sale of unpat-
ented "dry ice," had an express tying clause to rely on which
had been made a condition of each such sale. But the Leitch
case went to the limit yet reached by establishing the principle
that even in the absence of both an express license and a tying
clause, the patent owner may not by his "method of doing
business" achieve the same practical result as would be brought
about by the use of a tying clause.
The International Business Machines case' presented a
straight tying clause attached to leased machinery, and the de-
cision could-as it necessarily had to-be based squarely upon
the Clayton Act which was held to prohibit the tying of pat-
ented as well as unpatented supplies to leased machinery.
The Sinclair case6 has been included in this article because
it is a fairly late case upholding a tying restriction in the absence
of any patents, thus standing in significant contrast to the second
Shoe Machinery, Carbice, Business Machines, and Leitch cases
and demonstrating, by way of reflex, how completely the Court
has freed itself of the notion that patent protection has any
bearing on the validity of tying clauses; indeed, the existence
of such protection may now constitute one of the elements
vitiating a tying arrangement. It should be remembered that
the Clayton Act condemns the tying clause only where the effect
of the lease, sale, or contract for sale to which it is attached, or
the effect of the tying clause itself, "may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce;" and no such effect or tendency was found to exist
in the Sinclair case.
The General Talking Pictures case' has already been noted
' Supra, note 48.
4 Supra, note 57.
5 Supra, note 5 1.
6 Supra, note 46.
7 Supra, note 6o.
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in connection with the possible distinction between sale, lease
and license and its bearing on our problem.8 It further tends to
confirm the view that there are no fixed mechanical rules gov-
erning the limits to a patent owner's right to control the use
of his invention by others. The case need not be taken as an
indication that the tendency of the Court manifested in the
Carbice and Leitch cases has been reversed, although some such
fear may have played a part in causing Mr. Justice Black to dis-
sent. One may certainly argue that the right to determine the
nature of the use of a patented device is within the class of
"partial reservations" always recognized by the courts and that
the division of a patent monopoly into rights to exclusive use
in the "commercial" and "private" fields, respectively, is reason-
able enough, without at the same time admitting the legitimacy
of attempted control over supplementary or complementary
goods and the reasonableness of bringing such collateral restric-
tions under the category of partial reservations. In fact, the
Court has since reaffirmed the principle that a patent owner
"Cmay not, by virtue of his patent, condition his license so as to
tie to the use of a patented device or process the use of other
devices, processes or materials which lie outside of the monop-
oly of the patent licensed,"' and the broad doctrine of the Car-
bice and Leitch cases has been applied by several lower federal
courts."
Sutra, p. 231, et seq.
"Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (940), a
suit under the Sherman Act to enjoin an elaborate patent license system
principally on the ground that it was used for the purpose of resale price main-
tenance. While made primarily with reference to control of prices and market
practices, the following statement (at 459) is also significant: "The patent
monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of
a monopoly of another . . . than for the exploitation of an unpatented
article. .. ."
11(J. C. Ferguson Mfg. Works, Inc. v. American Lecithin Co., 94 F. (2d)
729 (C.C.A. Ist, 1938); American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., xo5 F.
(2d) 207 (C.C.A. 7th, 1939) (extending the doctrine to a suit for direct
infringement); Philad Co. v. Lechler Laboratories, Inc., 107 F. (zd) 747
(C.C.A. and, 1939) (rule not limited to attempted control of "staple ma-
terials"; nor is its operation prevented by the fact that the goods sought to be
"tied" are themselves under patent), but cf. Johnson Co., Inc. v. Philad Co.,
96 F. (2d) 442, 446 (C.C.A. 9 th, 1938) (strong intimation that rule applies
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CONCLUSION
A study of tying clause cases involving patented machines,
products or processes reveals a complicated interplay of notions
of public policy, common law principles, statutory construction,
and. constitutional limitations. Varied and heterogeneous con-
siderations have been used to support judicial pronouncements
at different times; but judicial attitude has not at all times
been determined by the elements used in its rationalization.
There was a long period during which the patent monopoly
was regarded as including the right to impose tying clauses; that
is to say, that right was thought to be derived from the patent
statute, if not the Constitution, and grave doubts were attendant
upon constitutionality of Congressional legislation depriving
the patent owner of his right 5 the constitutional problem could,
however, be avoided by a construction of such legislation as not
purporting to cut down the right. But the Sherman Act was
supplemented by the specific prohibitions of the Clayton Act,
and the only way, left then to avoid the constitutional issue was
to narrow down the Court's construction of the patent grant-
a way which had been paved by the Motion Picture Patents
decision, but blocked again in the first Shoe Machinery case. The
cases from the Motion Picture Patents to the Leitch case con-
demning the tying clause on general grounds, without the direct
aid of a statute, definitely recognized and settled the limited
scope of the patent monopoly.
It thus appears that, in spite of its early existence," the
patent monopoly had no predetermined boundary lines, any
more than other types of individual property rights. While the
Court has frequently insisted upon a contrary premise, the
only to "standard articles of commerce," to "standard unpatented articles") ;
B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 3z F. Supp. 690 (U.S.D.C. Mass., i94o). See
also Alemite Corporation v. Lubrair Corporation, 6z F. (zd) 899 (C.C.A.
Ist, 1933) (construing the scope of a patent narrowly so as not to conflict with
the doctrine of the Carbice case or, perhaps more accurately, its underlying
policy).
"1 For a brief general outline of the history of patent law in England and
this country, see Lamb, The Relation of the Patent Law to the Federal Anti-
Trust Laws (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 261, at 261-265.
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approach must be from a different side. No matter how strong
and beneficial to society the policy underlying the patent law
may be, the privileges conferred upon the patent owner are in
derogation of the common right. Our present economic system,
in theory if not always in action, rests upon the policy of main-
taining free competition, even apart from legislative declarations
of such policy. It is that public interest which in the final
analysis defines the scope and contents of the patent monopoly,
just as the public interest involved in the particular case has de-
termined the boundaries of "liberty and property" generally.
The state of the law may then be summarized as follows:
The tying clause, while not illegal by and in itself, will be con-
demned where it may tend to a substantial lessening of competi-
tion or to a monopoly in any line of interstate or foreign com-
merce. It matters not whether it be attached to sale, lease, or
license; it makes no difference whether it bind patented to
patented, patented to unpatented, unpatented to patented, or
unpatented to unpatented machinery, supplies, or processes;
and it may be struck down either with or without the aid of a
statute. The controlling consideration is its effect on competi-
tion, to an extent which has made the very term "tying clause"
too narrow; because, finally, it is immaterial whether or not
there be a "clause," or even a tacit consensual arrangement, at
all: a mere "method of doing business," if bringing about the
same undesirable result, is now given the same legal effect of a
defense in infringement proceedings, although it might not,
under existing statutes, supply a basis for affirmative action
against its user.
It is probably due to the Supreme Court's sweeping repudi-
ation of "1tying," even more than to the express language of the
Clayton Act, that the practices considered in this Article no
longer constitute a prominent problem of law reform. The
future will show how other abuses of the patent system can be
corrected, legislatively and judicially, and in what respects the
system itself may need possible modifications in order best to
serve the common good.
